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secured the ability not only to “leverage”
the United States politically but also
to command a seat at the geostrategic
“top table.” Jones presents the Skybolt
missile crisis of 1962 as an example of
this nuclear-based political leverage over
the United States. Aiming at updating
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the United
States promised delivery of the Skybolt
system. A nuclear, standoff, air-toground missile, Skybolt was designed to
penetrate Soviet airspace in the face of
an increasing Soviet antiballistic-missile
(ABM) capability. When President
Kennedy abruptly canceled the agreement in November 1962, he did so
ostensibly on technical grounds. In truth,
the United States opposed, on political
grounds, any extension to the life of the
U.K. nuclear deterrent. Seeing through
this ruse, Prime Minister Macmillan
was instrumental in resolving the crisis
at the Nassau conference in December
1962—by hoisting Kennedy’s policy
on its own petard. The United States
was forced to concede the nature of
its opposition to sharing Skybolt, and
instead to offer a replacement—which
paradoxically became Britain’s secondgeneration nuclear deterrent: the Polaris
missile system. Not only had Britain’s
first-generation deterrent not been
curbed, but the United States in fact had
become father to a second generation.
Volume 2 brings with it the advent of
a new ministry in 1964, led by Harold
Wilson and the Labour Party. The
necessity for a Polaris Improvement
Program takes center stage in this
volume, since the Polaris A-3 missile
was becoming obsolescent, just as the
second-generation Polaris system was
coming on line. There is a fascinating
portrayal of the Whitehall bureaucracy
at work in the constant race to maintain
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a semblance of qualitative nuclear
parity with the United States.
In the wake of the U.S. shift to the
Poseidon’s advanced technology of
the multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRV), Britain under
Wilson’s aegis set off alone to begin
exploitation of an intermediate technology, Antelope, that the United States had
developed but later abandoned in favor
of MIRVs. The climax of the U.K. Polaris
Improvement Program was reached with
Chevaline, a unique configurational
change to alter the front end of the
Polaris missile, thereby rendering it
all but invulnerable to interception by
deployed Soviet ABMs. But the history
of that program will have to await the
projected third volume in this series.
Meantime, Professor Jones has
written an excellent description of
Britain’s quest for a sovereign and
independent strategic nuclear deterrent.
Completely mastering his sources,
Jones has produced a compelling work
of lasting significance. He has come
full circle, following in the footsteps
of his larger-than-life role models,
Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold.
MYRON A. GREENBERG

Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a
Complex World, by Stanley McChrystal, with
Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris
Fussell. New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015. 290
pages. $29.95.

During the years he spent hunting
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and battling
the forces of Al Qaeda in the streets
and deserts of Iraq, General Stanley
McChrystal turned the Joint Special
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Operations Command into a remarkably
lethal, efficient, and effective killing
machine. To do so he performed an
extraordinary feat of social engineering, one that required modification of
very insulated cultures, delegation of
significant decision-making to very
low levels of the organization, and
widely sharing information in a manner
few would have predicted possible.
Team of Teams makes it clear that this
experience had a profound impact on
McChrystal. In the ensuing years of
reflection and serious study, the onetime
four-star general has concluded that
in a world of ever-increasing complexity, networks offer the best chance for
organizational success. The book both
tells the story of the joint interagency
task force and shows how modern
leaders can achieve similar results.
McChrystal argues that technologically
linked, extraordinarily nimble networks
increasingly will run rings around
organizations built around nineteenthcentury norms of hierarchy and
efficiency. The quest for efficiency must
give way to the pursuit of effectiveness.
Yet speed is still a virtue, and the
network must share vast amounts of
information in short amounts of time.
Accelerating the cycle of assessment,
decision, implementation, and reassessment to a pace not previously considered
possible will enable cutting inside
the decision loops of the competition
and ensure victory. In positing this,
McChrystal does not lack for boldness.
As the title suggests, McChrystal’s
twenty-first-century organizational
model constitutes a “team of teams.” In a
true team, the members fully understand
and deeply trust one another. However,
no small team, however gifted, can
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deliver the expertise and products
that the entire network demands.
McChrystal’s prescription involves crossassigning team members, colocating
previously isolated functions, and greatly
increasing the sharing of information.
Such connections are vital, for they
build trust as well as what are described
as organizational “neural networks.”
To his credit, McChrystal identifies
some potential weaknesses in running such a network. For example,
the risk of massive compromise, as
occurred with Chelsea Manning and
Edward Snowden, is always present. McChrystal takes the bold and
debatable position that the damage a
Manning or a Snowden may cause is
still a price worth paying, considering
the benefits of a modern network.
With sweeping changes in organizational
style come sweeping changes in leadership. In a modern network, decisionmaking is pushed down to a level where
a leader may become uncomfortable
with the degree of delegation. The results
of those decisions flow to the leader,
who, possessed of a more holistic view
of the organization, can push information and context back down to leaders
far lower in the chain of command.
Questions persist about whether
McChrystal’s model will work
universally. A few organizations, such
as NASA (for a time) or the Office of
Naval Reactors, might be able to achieve
and maintain the degree of dedication,
reliability, and intense commitment that
McChrystal expected and got from his
operators, but these are rare examples.
The book does not address other
essential aspects of organizations. How
does a networked organization promote,
reward, recruit, and retain its personnel?
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How does a leader deal with a workforce
that is increasingly transient and for
which organizational loyalty is no longer
a hallmark of professionalism? How are
questions involving public relations,
legality, and political involvement and
interest handled? These problems are
not unique to the military. There is no
discussion of how leaders cope with periods of disruption, challenge, or failure.
Two other issues deserve mention. The
first is the book’s method of citation:
there are no footnotes or traditional endnotes. This aids the casual reader but not
the serious scholar, student, or executive
who needs to delve deeper. Perhaps the
publisher insisted on this methodology;
if so, one hopes it is for the last time.
The other issue is more challenging.
McChrystal goes to significant lengths
to present Team of Teams as a collaborative effort. This is commendable, and
there may be portions of the book that
represent a collective effort that is so
interwoven it defies any assignment of
individual credit. However, McChrystal
is the only author who truly can explain
the senior leader’s perspective and feelings. As such, his voice should dominate
the work, or at least be given clearly
identified and dedicated portions of the
book to provide solely his point of view.
Despite these shortcomings, Team
of Teams belongs on any bookshelf
devoted to modern works on leadership.
It asks important questions, has more
than a few sensible recommendations, and provokes useful follow-on
conversations. Its readability also will
be a plus for business school students,
who increasingly will be likely to find
it on their list of required texts.
RICHARD J. NORTON
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Gear Up, Mishaps Down: The Evolution of Naval
Aviation Safety, 1950–2000, by Robert Dunn.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 224
pages. $29.95.

The average American’s view of
naval aviation likely is informed by
the movie Top Gun or, for those with
some historical knowledge, the carrier
battles of World War II in the Pacific.
Unknown even to most naval aviators
is a larger and equally dramatic story:
the Navy’s struggle to bring its aviation
accident rate under control. The number
of aircraft and aircrews lost to accidents
over the course of naval aviation’s history
is staggering—in the tens of thousands,
far more than ever were lost to combat.
A critical segment of that history
occurred during the period that retired
vice admiral Dunn reviews in his book.
After World War II, tectonic changes
occurred in naval aviation, including
the introduction of jet aircraft and
the advent of nuclear weapons. The
pressure on the Navy to demonstrate
the effectiveness of its aircraft carriers in
the rapidly evolving environment of the
1950s and ’60s was intense. The need to
fight in Korea with new and inadequately understood aircraft technology, as well
as to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent
posture day or night, in almost any
weather, produced horrendous accident
rates. In 1954 alone the Navy and Marine Corps lost 776 aircraft to accidents,
and 536 aircrewmen and passengers
were killed. There was legitimate doubt
that naval aviation would survive if that
rate of mishaps could not be reduced.
But survive it did, through reducing
accident rates—step by painful step. It
is a complex, multifaceted story that
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